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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
ys
- ( 13376 
S T E W A R T M I C H A E L KELSEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
This is a criminal action brought by the State of 
Utah against Defendant/Appellant, Stewart Michael 
Kelsey, charging him with the crime of murder in the 
first degree in violation of Section 76-30-3 U.C.A., 1953. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah on the 9th day of 
March, 1973, a sanity hearing was held before the Hon. 
1 
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Ernest F . Baldwin, Judge, and the Defendant was 
found competent, able to understand the nature of the 
processes against him and aid in his own defense and not 
insane. Subsequently, on the 18th day of April, 1973, 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Court sitting without 
a jury, Hon. D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, presiding, 
found Defendant/Appellant guilty of murder in the 
second degree and he was sentenced to imprisonment in 
the State Prison for the indeterminate term of ten years 
to life. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court dismissing 
the action, or in the alternative, reversing the verdict 
and judgment rendered at trial and remanding the case 
to the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah for a new trial consistent with the ruling of this 
Court. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Trial of the Appellant for the crime of murder in 
the first degree under an information charging him with 
violation of Section 76-30-3 commenced on April 9,1973 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Hon. D. Frank Wil-
kins, Judge, sitting without a jury. The Defendant 
waived his right to a trial by jury in open Court and the 
2 
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Court found that the Defendant made a proper waiver 
and further found that the waiver was voluntary, free, 
knowing, intelligent and understanding and proceeded 
to try the case without a jury. The State of Utah pre-
sented its case consisting of testimony and evidence 
summarized as follows: 
1. Diane Marie Eagle, testified that she was the 
mother of the deceased, Raymond Douglas Eagle, age 
three and one-half. On November 27, 1972 she left the 
child playing in the back yard at 851 West Second 
North, Salt Lake City, Utah in the care of the Appel-
lant, Stewart Michael Kelsey, at approximately 1:30 in 
the afternoon. (T. 18). She and the child had been liv-
ing with Appellant for approximately three months, 
(T. 22), during which time there had been no problems 
between Kelsey and the child. (T. 26). She arrived back 
home at approximately 8:00 that evening and found 
that the child had been taken to the University Hospital. 
(T. 24-25). 
2. Mrs. Betty Herron identified herself as the 
mother of Stewart Michael Kelsey, Appellant, and on 
November 27, 1973, she was residing at 851 West 200 
North, Salt Lake City. She arrived home at approxi-
mately 5:00 in the afternoon on that date in a cab, and 
her son, Kelsey, brought the child Raymond to the cab 
with bruises on his face. Mrs. Herron and Kelsey then 
took the child to the University Hospital in the taxi cab. 
On the way to the hospital the child started gasping for 
breath, (T. 76) and Mrs. Herron attempted mouth to 
3 
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mouth resuscitation in order to revive him, as well as 
heart massage. 
Mrs. Herron arrived home from the hospital at ap-
proximately 2:30 a.m. at which time the police arrived. 
Kelsey was in their custody. The police came into the 
house without a search warrant and searched the bed-
room, taking washcloths and clothing with them, to-
gether with a plastic bottle which Mrs. Herron used for 
sprinkling clothes in preparation for ironing. (T. 86). 
Mrs. Herron testified that she slept in the living room 
and that Kelly, Kenneth and Stewart Michael Kelsey, 
the Appellant, slept in the bedroom. Further that Kel-
sey had been staying with her for approximately a week, 
(T. 86) or a week and a half (T. 330) was free to go in 
and out of the house, that he slept there, kept his clothes 
there, and had paid her some money, partly for a tele-
phone bill and partly for groceries. (T. 331). 
3. Dr. Dominic Albo, a surgeon and Assistant Pro-
fessor of Surgery at the University of Utah testified 
that he had performed a surgical procedure on Ray-
mond Eagle on the night of November 27, 1972, be-
tween the hours of 4:30 and 6:30 p.m. (T. 132) at Uni-
versity Hospital. The child had sustained soft tissue 
trauma, abrasions, and bruises around the face, eyes, 
mouth and ears and his abdomen was distended. (T. 
132). During the surgical operation the abdomen was 
opened and blood was found in the abdomen, possibly 
due to a large laceration of the liver which the doctor 
identified as an explosion type of injury to the liver. 
4 
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(T. 133). The doctor proceeded to sew up the laceration 
and the patient was prepared for additional surgery on 
the head. However, the child lost consciousness, was 
pronounced dead, (T. 136) and no further surgery was 
performed. 
4. Dr. James T. Weston, a forensic pathologist, 
Physician and Chief Medical Examiner in the State of 
Utah testified that he had performed a post mortem ex-
amination of a three and one-half year old child named 
Raymond Eagle on November 28, 1972 at approxi-
mately 1:30 p.m. in the afternoon. (T. 279). The doctor 
described the physical aspects of the child's body and 
stated that the cause of death was the result of a multi-
plicity of internal injuries, some to the head, some to the 
thorax and some to the abdomen. (T. 302). The most 
fatal injury was a laceration of the liver. 
5. Jerry Campbell, a police officer of Salt Lake 
City Corporation testified that he had interviewed Kel-
sey's brother Kelly, (T. 172) age 11, at approximately 
10:35 p.m. on November 27,1972. He then interrogated 
the Appellant for approximately 30 minutes after which 
he read him his Fifth Amendment rights from a Miran-
da card. (T. 176 and 190). Thereafter, a police sten-
ographer was called, the Miranda card read a second 
time and a statement taken from Kelsey. After the 
statement was taken the police officer, in the company 
of Kelsey and Detective Larry Hardwick proceeded to 
851 West Second North and conducted a search. Ex-
hibit marked 13, a plastic bottle, was identified as ob-
5 
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tained by Officer Hardwick (T. 184), as well as Ex-
hibit 14, a dishrag which the officer testified that he had 
picked up. (T. 184). The Exhibit marked 15, a wash-
rag, was recovered from the bedroom. (T. 185). Ex-
hibit 12, the belt, was found in the bedroom. (T. 185). 
6. Larry Hardwick, police officer for Salt Lake 
Corporation, Salt Lake City, Utah testified that at ap-
proximately 1:00 a.m. on the morning of November 28, 
he accompanied other police officers to the house at 851 
West 200 North with Kelsey in custody. A Miranda 
card was read to Kelsey prior to reaching the house but 
there was no discussion concerning Appellant's rights 
to refuse a search of the premises. (T. 337). The offi-
cers searched the premises without first obtaining the 
permission of Kelsey (T. 338) and without a search 
warrant, (T. 339) and obtained several articles identi-
fied as a belt, a washrag, a dishcloth and a plastic bottle. 
7. Rhea Hill, stenographer, testified that she took 
down the statement of the Defendant in shorthand. On 
the stand she made corrections of the statement from her 
notes. (T. 257-263). The stenographer testified that 
when the officer read the Miranda warning to the Ap-
pellant he read it so fast that she was unable to take it 
down and that she copied it afterwards from the card. 
(T. 257). 
Other witnesses were called by the State who did 
not contribute anything of significance to the evidence 
adduced against the Appellant. Appellant presented 
the following evidence on defense : 
6 
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1. (a.) Stewart Michael Kelsey took the stand for 
the limited purpose of testifying to the fact that he had 
not given a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. 
Each time the Miranda card was read to him he under-
stood it as meaning that he would have to make a state-
ment in any case and that he would not be able to re-
main silent if an attorney were called. 
(b.) Appellant's testimony was corroborated by 
Mr. Gilbert Athay, Legal Defense Association, who 
had been called to defend Kelsey on November 28, 1972 
(T. 208-210) and interviewed Kelsey just after he was 
returned to jail following the search at 851 West Sec-
ond North. 
(c.) Richard S. Shepard, Deputy County Attor-
ney, testified that he accompanied the police officers 
when they went to the residence for the search, and had 
borrowed a Miranda card from one of the officers and 
read it to Kelsey in the police car. Richard Shepard 
testified that he was concerned that Kelsey did not ap-
preciate the gravity of the situation (T. 223) and that 
he felt that Appellant had to understand that he and 
Mr. Cone, the police officer, were not his friends. "We 
were the persons who were going to try and put him in 
prison so he should be careful about what he said when 
he was around us." (T. 224), 
2. Dr. Lewis G. Moench and Dr. Eugene Bliss had 
made a preliminary psychiatric examination of Kelsey 
and determined that he was competent to stand trial and 
aid in his defense. At the trial, Dr. Moench testified that 
7 
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he had found that Kelsey had dull normal intelligence 
and had a character disorder known as a sociopathic 
personality, which manifests itself in an inability or di-
minished ability to control his emotional reaction when 
provoked. (Drs. Report) ; that Kelsey does not solve 
problems by rational judgment and his ability to think 
things out in time of crisis is terribly diminished (T. 
338). That the Defendant Reacts very little to stimuli 
until a threshold is reached when sudden or explosive 
reactions occur (T. 365) ; that the Defendant did not 
have sufficient time to consider what he was doing (T. 
378), nor the ability (T. 379), to weigh the conse-
quences of what was going on at the time; that at the 
time Kelsey hit the child in the stomach he was acting 
impulsively, (T. 379) that the fact that he tried to re-
vive the child by giving him first aid, and also tried to 
make the child walk, exhibited the fact that Kelsey was 
presented with a situation which he did not know how to 
handle, but he was frightened and angry and that he 
was simply attempting to make the child prove to him 
that he was not injured. (T. 379 and 385). The doctor 
also testified that there was nothing in his examination 
which indicated that Kelsey had planned in advance to 
hurt the child (T. 385) that "he was simply frightened 
and angered because he was presented with a problem 
he couldn't handle." The doctor testified that, in his 
opinion, Kelsey was emotionally overcharged at the 
time of the incident due to an altercation with his step-
father the day before and also the fact that he was com-
ing down from a dose of amphetamines taken the pre-
vious day (T. 387). 
8 
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3. Dr. James Weston was called on behalf of the 
defense and qualified as a forensic pathologist, with 
expertise in the area of the "battered child." Dr. West-
on testified that Kelsey followed a pattern of a socio-
economic-cultural problem in the category of the abuse 
of a child by a paramour. That in such case, the para-
mour who is living with the mother and a child not his 
own tends to have resentment and jealousy of the child 
and at some time in their relationship may lash out 
against the child if provoked, even in a minor way. (T. 
407). That Kelsey's educational and psychiatric back-
ground together with his relationship with the mother 
of the child and the child itself indicated that Kelsey 
fitted into this category. (T. 412). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D IN ACCEPT-
I N G A P P E L L A N T ' S W A I V E R O F A J U R Y 
W H E N H E W A S C H A R G E D W I T H F I R S T 
D E G R E E M U R D E R . 
The Defendant waived his right to a jury trial in 
open Court and the Judge found that the waiver was 
valid and voluntary, accepted Appellant's waiver and 
heard the case without a jury. 
Section 77-27-2, U.C.A., 1953, provides: 
In all cases except where a sentence of death 
may be imposed, the trial by jury may be waived 
by the defendant. (Emphasis added) 
9 
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Clearly, defendants may waive a jury in all cases 
except capital cases. No other interpretation can be 
made of Section 77-27-2 in view of the words "except 
where a sentence of death may be imposed." 
Kelsey was charged and tried for the crime of first 
degree murder. The penalty for first degree murder is 
set forth in Section 76-30-4, U.C.A., 1953, which pro-
vides : 
Every person guilty of murder in the first de-
gree shall suffer death, or, upon the recommen-
dation of the jury, may be imprisoned at hard 
labor in the state prison for life, in the discretion 
of the court. . . . (Emphasis added). 
This Court has interpreted Section 76-30-4 in the case 
of State v. Markham, 100 Utah 226, 112 P.2d 496 
(1941). 
The death sentence is mandatory for first degree 
murder unless the jury recommends a different 
penalty, when it becomes discretionary. 
I t is to be noted that the statute concerning the pen-
alty for murder in the first degree grants discretion to 
the jury and not to the Court. In a case of the Court 
sitting without a jury, therefore, the Court would have 
no discretion to recommend leniency upon a conviction 
of first degree murder, and the death sentence would be 
absolutely mandatory. Thus such a waiver falls directly 
under the proscription of waiver as set forth in Section 
77-27-2. 
The general rule in the courts of the United States 
is that a full jury of twelve cannot be waived by a De-
10 
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fendant upon a plea of not guilty in a felony case, ex-
cept upon express authority of a statute or the constitu-
tion of the state involved. (See 48 A L R 767, 58 A L R 
1031, 70 A L R 279, 47 Am Jur 2d, Jury, 72.) Our 
statute which allows such a waiver in most felony cases, 
expressly excepts waiving a jury in a capital case and 
the acceptance of the Appellant's waiver of the jury 
constitutes reversible error. 
In the case of Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 42 
L.ed. 1061, 18 S.Ct. 620, (1889), the Defendant was 
tried by an eight man jury under a statute of the terri-
tory of Utah which reduced the number of jurors from 
twelve to eight. The Supreme Court of the United 
States stated: 
I t was not in the power of a person accused of 
felony by consent expressly given or by his si-
lence to authorize a jury of only eight persons to 
pass upon the question of his guilt. 
In the Thompson case, the defendant had simply ac-
quiesed in the trial of his case by a jury of eight in view 
of the statute. However, in the case of Low v. U.S., 169 
F . 86 (6th Cir. 1909), the defendat had waived a jury. 
The court reversed the conviction saying: 
Undoubtedly the accused has a right to waive 
everything which pertains to form and much 
which is of the structure of a trial. But he may 
not waive that which concerns both himself and 
the public, nor any matter which involves funda-
mentally the jurisdiction of the Court. The juris-
diction of the Court to pronounce a judgment or 
conviction for crime, when there has been a plea 
11 
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of not guilty, rests upon the foundation of a ver-
dict by a jury. Without that basis the judgment 
is void. 
In neither the Thompson case nor the Low case, 
was the Court confronted with a statute which allowed 
waiver by a defendant in a felony case. But our statute 
expressly prohibits a waiver of a jury in a capital case. 
The Appellant had no power to waive a jury, and the 
Court's acceptance of his waiver, whether made volun-
tarily or not, is incredible in the face of Section 77-27-2 
U.C.A., 1953, which was cited to the Court. Nothing in 
the record shows the basis on which the Court ruled that 
such a waiver was acceptable. 
During the time Kelsey was charged, tried and 
convicted the status of capital punishment was, and still 
is, unsetled, due to the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 33 L.ed. 2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972), which, it 
was widely assumed, abolished capital punishment as 
being cruel and unusual punishment and in violation of 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States. However, a careful read-
ing of the Furman decision reveals that the decision did 
not abolish capital punishment; first, because the deci-
sion was limited to the three cases at bar, and second, be-
cause the decision does not abolish capital punishment 
per se, but only the discretion of a court or jury to im-
pose capital punishment. Of the five opinions constitut-
ing the majority of the Court, three Justices, Mr. 
Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice 
12 
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Stewart specifically stated that they did not reach the 
decision of whether a mandatory death sentence in 
which the Judge or jury did not have discretion, would 
be unconstitutional. The statute providing for punish-
ment of first degree murder in the State of Utah pro-
vides that the death sentence is mandatory as inter-
preted in State v. Markham, supra, and Furman v. 
Georgia does not apply. See Mr. Justice Ellett's dissent 
in State v. James, 30 Utah 2d 32, 512 P.2d 1031 (1973). 
Even if Furman v. Georgia abolished capital pun-
ishment in the State of Utah, however, the crime of first 
degree murder is still a "capital" crime. This Court has 
held in two cases, since the U. S. Supreme Court rend-
ered its decision in Furmam, that nothing in that case 
can be construed to abrogate our fundamental law and 
that under the Constitution and statutes of the State of 
Utah the crime of first degree murder is still a "capital" 
offense. In the case of State v. James, supra, the Trial 
Court in a hearing in chambers prior to the trial ruled 
that since Furman v. Georgia abolished capital crimes, 
the Defendant, charged with first degree murder, was 
entitled only to an eight man jury as provided in Sec-
tion 78-48-5 U.C.A., 1953. Upon appeal this Court re-
versed, stating: 
Capital cases, as this term is used in Article I, 
Section 10, of the Utah Constitution refers to a 
category of criminal actions including therein the 
entire prosecution and not merely the last stage, 
the penalty phase. Furman v. Georgia is limited 
to this final phase of the action, the imposition 
and execution of the death penalty. Murder in 
13 
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the first degree has been classified as a capital 
crime by the legislature; Furman affected only 
the punishment; the nature of the crime remains 
unchanged. Defendant was entitled to a trial by 
a twelve man jury; the trial court committed 
prejudicial error when it denied him this right. 
(Emphasis in original). 
The same result was reached in Roll v. Larsen, 30 
Utah 2d 273, 516 P.2d 1392 (1973) in interpreting Sec-
tion 77-43-3, U.C.A., 1953, which provides that a de-
fendant charged with a crime "punishable by death" 
may be admitted to bail only by a Judge of the Supreme 
or District Court. 
Trial by a twelve man jury in a capital case is a 
part of our fundamental law. Article I Section 10 of 
the Utah Constitution provides that the right to trial by 
jury shall remain inviolate. Appellant was entitled to a 
trial by a twelve man jury and had no power to waive 
the jury. The trial Court was in error when it denied 
him this right, in view of the statute of this State spe-
cifically denying the Appellant the power to waive a 
jury, and had no jurisdiction to pronounce judgment in 
the absence of a jury. The judgment of the Court below 
should be reversed. 
P O I N T I I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
THE STATEMENT MADE BY APPELLANT 
TO THE POLICE WITHOUT BENEFIT OF 
COUNSEL. 
14 
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A. A P P E L L A N T D I D NOT K N O W I N G L Y 
A N D I N T E L L I G E N T L Y W A I V E H I S F I F T H 
A M E N D M E N T R I G H T S A T T H E T I M E O F 
GIVING A S T A T E M E N T TO T H E P O L I C E . 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the 
case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.ed. 2d 
694, 86 S.Ct 1602 (1966), held that a confession ob-
tained by the police without the presence of counsel 
representing the Defendant may be admitted in Court 
as evidence only if the Defendant has knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel. Further, the 
Court held that a substantial burden is on the govern-
ment to prove that the Defendant knowingly and in-
telligently waived his constitutional rights. In the case 
at bar the government has failed to meet that burden 
of proof. 
After substantial in-custody interrogation of the 
Defendant, the police read to Kelsey a "Miranda" card 
designed to enable the police to advise defendants of 
their rights in accordance with the Miranda decision. In 
an attempt to obtain a waiver of Appellant's rights Kel-
sey was asked by the police officers if he understood the 
rights and if he wished to talk to them. Each time the 
Miranda card was read to Kelsey he did not understand 
what was being read to him. Taking the stand for the 
limited purpose of testifying to the voluntariness of the 
confession Kelsey was asked by Mr. Hill: 
Q. O.K., now, did Officer Campbell subsequent-
ly read to you, 'If you wish to answer questions 
now without contacting a lawyer and without a 
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lawyer present you have the right to stop answer-
ing questions at any time?' Did he read that to 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did that mean to you? 
A. That meant if I didn't have a lawyer there, if 
I decided not to talk to them I wouldn't have to, 
and if I had a lawyer there that I would have to 
go ahead and talk to them anyway. Even though 
a lawyer was there I would still have to talk to 
them. 
Q. But that if you talked with them right away 
without having a lawyer, that you could quit at 
any time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you advise anyone of this at a later time? 
A. Yes, when Gil Athay came to the jail, when 
they took me to the jail, I told Gil Athay about 
it 
Q. Is that why you didn't ask for an attorney to 
be present? 
A. Yes. (T. 199). 
Upon cross examination Mr. VanDam asked Kelsey: 
Q. And you didn't understand that you had the 
right to remain silent? 
A. No, I didn't understand that at the time. 
Q. That sentence doesn't mean anything to you? 
Q. Do you or don't you understand that when 
you say that to you? 
16 
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A. In a way I do and in a way I don't. 
Q. Will you explain to me how you do or don't, 
please? 
A. When they was reading it to me it didn't 
come out exactly the way 'you have the right to 
remain silent'. Officer McCurdy came back and 
says 'If you wish to talk to us now you can stop 
talking any time you want to'. (T. 202) 
Mr. Gil Athay, Legal Defender's office, was called 
to represent Appellant after Kelsey was brought back 
to jail and after he had given the statement to the police. 
Mr. Athay testified (T. 210) that when he talked with 
Kelsey, he "responded to me that it was his understand-
ing from what he had been told that he had to give the 
statement, that if he asked for a lawyer, he would not be 
able to stop talking. He indicated that he understood 
from what he had been told that he had to talk to them if 
a lawyer showed up, and once he began to talk with a 
lawyer present, he would have to continue to talk until 
the police told him he was through." 
The testimony of both Kelsey and Mr. Athay show 
clearly that Kelsey had a fundamental lack of under-
standing of his right to silence and the reading to him 
from the Miranda card did nothing to enlighten him of 
his rights. The essence of the Miranda decision is not 
that the police must perform a ritual of reading from a 
card prior to obtaining a statement from a defendant 
but that the police must first obtain a knowing and in-
telligent waiver of the rights by advising the defendant 
of his constitutional right to silence and being sure that 
the defendant understands those rights and the conse-
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quences of waiving them. The Court in the Miranda 
case stated (P. 476): 
The requirement of warnings and waiver of 
rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege and not simply a prelim-
inary ritual to existing methods of interrogation. 
(Emphasis added) 
Kelsey did not understand his rights and could 
therefore not give a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
those rights. A waiver is an abandonment of a known 
right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 82 L.ed. 1461, 
58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938). By Kelsey's testimony and that 
of Mr. Gil Athay who interviewed him shortly after he 
gave his statement, he was confused. Other testimony 
corroborates the fact that Kelsey was confused and 
could not have given a knowing and intelligent waiver 
of rights at the time. The stenographer, Rhea Hill, 
testified (T. 201) that at the time the rights were read 
to Kelsey prior to taking his statement they were read 
so fast that she could not take them down in shorthand. 
The process smacks of a ritual reading by the police. 
Richard Shepard, Deputy County Attorney, testified 
(T. 223) that Kelsey was confused about the fact that 
he did not know an attorney. Richard Shephard, who 
rode with the police and Kelsey in the police car after 
the statement was taken by the police testified: 
I was concerned at the time that he did not ap-
preciate the gravity of the matter . . . (T. 225) 
and further: 
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I believe there was something to the effect either 
by Mr. Cone or by myself that he had to under-
stand that we were not his friends. We were the 
persons who were going to try and put him in 
prison so he should be careful about what he said 
when he was around us. (T. 224) 
The Court in Miranda stated, page 469: 
I t is only through an awareness of these conse-
quences that there can be any assurance of real 
understanding and intelligent exercise of the 
privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to 
make the individual acutely aware that he is 
faced with a phase of the adversary system, that 
he is not in the presence of persons acting solely 
in his interest. (Emphasis added.) 
Kelsey did not understand these things. According to 
Richard Shephard, the Defendant did not understand 
that the police were not his friends, nor did he under-
stand the consequences of waiving his privilege to the 
extent required before he could intelligently and know-
ingly waive those privileges, under Miranda v. Arizona. 
The State did not bring forth any evidence to prove 
that the Defendant understood his rights in any way 
other than the way in which he stated on the stand, al-
though the State had the burden of proving that he 
waived his Fifth Amendment rights in a knowing and 
intelligent manner. This Court has stated that it is in 
agreement that the privilege against self incrimination 
includes a warning concerning those rights given by the 
police and that the burden is on the prosecution to prove 
that the statement is given voluntarily. State v. Lopez, 
22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969). 
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I t is clear from the record that Kelsey was in a sit-
uation in which he was being swept along in the current 
of events, was intimidated by the apparent authority of 
the police and did not understand that he had a right to 
stand silent before them in spite of their interrogation. 
Kelsey did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver 
of his Fifth Amendment rights and the Court's admis-
sion of the statement constitutes prejudicial error when 
such a waiver was not made. 
B. T H E S T A T E M E N T G I V E N TO T H E 
P O L I C E BY A P P E L L A N T W A S NOT VOL-
U N T A R I L Y GIVEN. 
Kelsey was taken to the police station at approxi-
mately 9:00 p.m. and questioned until approximately 
11:35 p.m. when his statement was taken down by a 
stenographer. (T. 195 and 193). During the interim 
Kelsey was kept by himself, out of communication with 
the rest of his family or of anyone else except the police. 
During this time Kelsey's little brother, Kelly, was 
questioned by the police. Kelly was a child, age 11, 
whom the Court found to be incompetent to testify as a 
witness because he was highly suggestible and tended to 
fantasize. 
According to the testimony of Officer Gail Mc-
Curdy in both the preliminary hearing and the trial of 
the case, Officer McCurdy interrogated Kelly out of 
the presence of Kelsey and later, together with Ser-
geant Johnson confronted Kelsey with the statement 
given by his little brother. At that time Kelsey gave a 
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statement to the police which led to the formal recorded 
statement some one half hour later. (T. 174) In the first 
interrogation by the police, Kelsey had not been booked 
nor charged (R. 84), he had not been advised of his 
rights (T. 176), nor did the Defendant know how badly 
the child was hurt or that he had died. The first that 
Kelsey knew that he was to be charged with first degree 
murder was when Richard Shephard so informed him 
long after the statement had been given (T. 206). 
I t is to be noted that Miranda was questioned for 
two hours, the same period of time Kelsey was interro-
gated prior to giving his statement. 
The courts of this country have long been very sus-
picious of a confession given by a defendant in a felony 
case where the defendant did not have the benefit of 
counsel. In the case of Escobedo v. California, 378 U.S. 
478,12 L.ed. 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758 (1964) the court stated 
on page 489: 
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient 
and modern, that a system of criminal law en-
forcement which comes to depend upon the con-
fession will in the long run be less viable and 
more subject to abuses than a system which de-
pends on extrinsic evidence independently se-
cured through skillful investigation. 
Later in the case of Miranda, supra, the United States 
Supreme Court reiterated the Escobedo case stating: 
(p. 469) 
The circumstances surrounding in-custody in-
terrogation can operate very quickly to overbear 
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the will of one merely made aware of his privi-
lege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to 
have counsel present at interrogation is indis-
pensible to the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege under the system we delineate 
today. 
And again on page 476: 
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to 
the waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of 
lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incar-
ceration before a statement is made is strong evi-
dence that the accused did not validly waive his 
rights. In these circumstances the fact that the 
individual eventually made a statement is con-
sistent with the conclusion that the compelling in-
fluence of the interrogation finally forced him to 
do so. I t is inconsistent with any notion of volun-
tary relinquishment of the privilege. 
In Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 84 L.ed. 716, 60 
S.Ct. 472 (1940), the United States Supreme Court 
stated that coercion can be mental as well as physical 
and that the blood of the accused is not the only hall-
mark of an unconstitutional inquisition. Further, in the 
case of Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, page 464: 
The determination of whether there has been an 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must 
depend in each case upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case, including 
the background, experience and conduct of the 
accused. 
Kelsey was found by the psychiatrists to be of dull 
normal intelligence. I t is not surprising that Kelsey was 
easily overwhelmed by the authority of the police in this 
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situation. H e was unaware of the gravity of the injuries 
received by the child or the fact that he had died and was 
further unaware of the consequences to himself in mak-
ing a statement to the police. Further, he had been in-
terrogated for a period of two hours and was finally 
confronted by three policemen, McCurdy, Johnson and 
Campbell, without aid of legal counsel or without the 
benefit of any friend at the police station. H e was told 
his little brother Kelly had informed the police of the 
true circumstances concerning the child's injuries. Even 
after he was informed of his rights, Kelsey believed that 
the interrogation would continue until a confession was 
obtained, whether or not he had an attorney present. As 
the court in the Miranda case indicated on page 468: 
I t is not just the sub-normal or woefully ignor-
ant who succumb to an interrogator's impreca-
tions whether implied or expressly stated, that 
the interrogations will continue until a confession 
is obtained or that silence in the face of accusa-
tion is itself damning and will bode ill when pre-
sented to a jury. 
In this case the Appellant was both sub-normal and 
woefully ignorant and no statement given by him under 
these circumstances can be said to have been given vol-
untarily within the meaning of the rules set forth in the 
Miranda, Zerbst, Chambers and Escobedo cases, and 
the admission of Appellant's statement was prejudicial 
error. 
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P O I N T I I I 
T H E COURT E R R E D I N D E N Y I N G A P P E L -
L A N T ' S MOTION TO SUPPRESS E V I D E N C E 
T A K E N FROM A P P E L L A N T ' S R E S I D E N C E . 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States guarantees each citizen to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, house, 
papers and effects. Where a search is made without a 
warrant, as it was in this case, it is presumed to be un-
reasonable unless such search is made incident to a valid 
arrest for the purpose of self-protection of the police 
against weapons and to prevent escape or unless the ob-
jects searched for were in plain view of the officers. 
Chimel vs. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L.ed. 2d 685, 89 
S.Ct. 2034 (1969). Otherwise, clear and unequivocal 
evidence must be presented that the person whose rights 
are secured by the Fourth Amendment gave intelligent 
and specific consent to the search. Nerrel vs. Superior 
Court of Orange County, 97 Cal. Rep. 702 (1971), 
Wren vs. U.S., 352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965). 
I t is evident in this case that this search was not 
made incident to an arrest, since at the time of the search 
Kelsey was already under arrest. There was no danger 
of his escaping and no personal danger to the officers 
involved. This ground for a warrantless search is absent 
where the search occurs in a remote time or place from 
the actual arrest. Chimel v. California, supra. Further, 
the burden on the government is particularly heavy in 
a case where the individual is already under arrest at the 
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time of the search. Coercion is more easily found if the 
defendant is in custody since the defendant is more 
likely to be overwhelmed by the authority of the police 
especially where the police are carrying guns (T. 338), 
where the defendant is in handcuffs (T. 98) and where 
there are a number of officers. 
Non resistance to the orders or suggestions of the 
police is not infrequent in such a situation; true 
consent, free of fear or pressure is not so readily 
to be found. Judd v. U.S., 190 F.2d 649 (D.C, 
Cir. 1951) 
There is no question that Kelsey did not waive his 
constitutional rights in this instance. He was neither 
asked permission to enter and search the house nor was 
he advised that anything obtained from the house could 
be used in evidence against him. (T. 338). Just as in 
the case of waiver of Fifth and Sixth Amendment, 
waiver of a warrantless search and seizure can only be 
valid if the defendant knows that he has a right to deny 
the search. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. In the case of 
Cipres v. U.S., 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the Trial Court which had found that 
the defendant had voluntarily waived her Fourth 
Amendment right because she answered "yes" to the 
police's question of whether they could open her bags. 
The Court stated that the issue was whether Cipres had 
waived her constitutional immunity from unreasonable 
search and seizure. Waiver in this context means "in-
tentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege/' 
said the Court, and "such a waiver cannot be conclusive-
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ly presumed from a verbal expression of assent." The 
Court must determine from all the circumstances 
whether the verbal assent reflected an understanding, 
uncoerced and unequivocal election to grant the officers 
a license which the person knows may be freely and 
effectively withheld. 
Even though there is some testimony to the effect 
that Kelsey assisted the police officers in conducting the 
search, inasmuch as he picked up the belt after they had 
arrived at the premises, this cannot be construed as hav-
ing given consent since at that time he did not know that 
he had a right to refuse the police to search the premises 
and the record is absolutely devoid of anything indicat-
ing that he did have such knowledge. 
However, the State argued that Mrs. Herron, who 
paid the rent on the premises had given her consent to 
the search. Mrs. Herron likewise was not advised by the 
police that they did not have a warrant and that under 
the circumstances she had a right to refuse a search of 
the premises. In response to the question as to why she 
had let the police in the house, Mrs. Herron said "Well, 
I wanted to be a law abiding citizen." (T. 99). The im-
plication is clear that Mrs. Herron did not realize that 
she could be a law abiding citizen by standing on her 
rights and refusing entry to the police. I t is equally 
clear that Mrs. Herron was overwhelmed by the author-
ity of the police and that any consent that she gave at 
that time was not a valid waiver of her Fourth Amend-
ment rights. Judd v. U.S., supra. 
Even if Mrs. Herron had given a knowing and in-
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telligent waiver of her own right to be free from a war-
rantless search and seizure, she cannot waive the rights 
of the defendant. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 11 
L.ed. 2d 856, 84 S.Ct. 889 (1964). Most of the items 
obtained through the search and seizure were found in 
the bedroom, one of them under the bedding on the bed. 
Mrs. Herron did not use that bedroom and no one who 
had the use of the bedroom gave consent to the search. 
Appellant and his mother had an agreement that he 
would give her room and board for staying there. (T. 
335). However, he had only been there for a week and 
no payment on the room and board was yet due. He had, 
however, given her $40.00, part of which went toward 
buying the groceries. Kelsey was a tenant of Mrs. Her-
ron under the meaning of Stoner v. California, and had 
a right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure, 
even if the owner of the premises gave consent. 
Under circumstances such as this, there is no reason 
for the police not to obtain a warrant before they search. 
There was no danger of the Defendant escaping from 
them, there was no personal danger to the police and 
the police had plenty of time in which to obtain such a 
warrant. The Fourth Amendment is directed against 
warrantless searches and in most cases the entire prob-
lem of unreasonable search and seizure could be cured 
easily if the police were required first to obtain a war-
rant before they set out to pick up evidence. Since there 
was no warrant obtained and no valid consent given for 
the search the prosecution may not utilize the fruits of 
the search at trial Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L.ed. 
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2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961), and the Court com-
mitted prejudicial error in allowing such evidence to be 
admitted. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E R E I S NO E V I D E N C E O F M A L I C E 
A F O R E T H O U G H T ON T H E P A R T O F A P -
P E L L A N T U P O N W H I C H TO B A S E T H E 
C O U R T S J U D G M E N T O F SECOND D E G R E E 
M U R D E R , OR U P O N W H I C H TO BASE T H E 
COURT'S CONCLUSION O F L A W N U M B E R 
TWO. 
Section 76-30-1 U.C.A., 1953, defines murder as 
follows: 
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being 
with malice aforethought. 
In the case of State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 
P.2d 153 (1946) this Court stated "there can be no mur-
der without malice aforethought, which means planned, 
designed and thought out beforehand." 
In this case the Defendant neither planned, de-
signed nor thought out beforehand the actual killing nor 
did he give thought prior to his action of any malicious 
feelings or desires. There was no malice connected with 
the injuries inflicted upon the child. The Defendant 
acted solely out of fear. According to the testimony by 
Dr. Moench, which was uncontroverted by the prosecu-
tion, the Defendant was frightened because he was pre-
sented with a situation he did not know how to handle. 
Dr. Moench testifies: 
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My opinion was that he encountered a situation 
that he didn't know how to handle. H e was 
frightened and angry and as he attempted to 
make the child prove to him that he was not in-
jured, the child couldn't prove that he was not 
injured by getting up and walking as he asked 
him to do or ordered him to do, and so this, I 
think, would make him angry and frightened and 
he would lash out at the child, trying to make the 
child remove the cause of his anger and fear. I 
think he was frightened repeatedly, and he at-
tempted to make this little child remove this an-
ger. (T. 379) 
Here is the situation. A twenty year old boy, of 
dull intelligence, is left to babysit with a three and one-
half year old child. The mother has left the house with-
out telling the child she is going to go. The Appellant 
has known the child and lived with it for the past three 
months and believes the child to be a bit spoiled and 
somewhat of a momma's boy. (T. 378). I t is to be as-
sumed that the Appellant expects the child to make 
some fuss when he discovers that the mother has left 
him. The child is in the back yard playing on a rickety 
slide. The Appellant hears a noise in the back yard and 
believes the child has fallen off the slide. The Appellant 
races outside where he finds the child on the ground 
crying. He believes the child is malingering and making 
more of a fuss than is necessary, and strikes the child 
with his belt a couple of times in order to make him be-
have. This punishment is severe, but the Appellant has 
dull intelligence and it conforms with the punishments 
he has seen inflicted by his parents as well as punish-
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ment he has received himself. At this point the child's 
injuries are certainly not such as would cause the Ap-
pellant to believe that they were fatal. However, the 
child is bleeding. Perhaps he really has been hurt in his 
fall from the slide. Kelsey takes the child inside, wipes 
the blood away and tries to make the child walk in an 
attempt to prove that he was not injured in the fall from 
the slide. However the child cannot or will not walk. 
The Appellant becomes frightened. H e has no one to 
turn to for advice or help. H e has no telephone and no 
car. The child has not proved that he is not injured and 
Kelsey is unable to tell how badly injured the child is. 
H e lashes out at the child and hits him again through 
fear. The Defendant is afraid to allow the child to go to 
sleep. He pours water over his head in an attempt to 
revive him. The child keeps falling down and the Ap-
pellant still not knowing what to do, afraid because he 
does not know what to do and completely unaware that 
he himself is causing the injuries lashes out at the child 
again. 
Kelsey's actions in this situation were very unfor-
tunate. They show the dull intelligence of the Appel-
lant, and his inability to act in a thoughtful and rational 
manner during a crisis, but they do not show malice 
aforethought on the part of Kelsey, or any intent to 
cause such bodily injury as might result in death. There 
is no evidence presented by the State on this point. The 
only evidence presented to explain the Appellant's ac-
tions in this instance is that of Dr. Moench the psychia-
trist. He testified that in his opinion Kelsey had no pre-
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meditation to injure the child. H e testified that it was 
his opinion that Kelsey did not even intend to harm the 
child. Mr. Van Dam on cross examining Dr. Moench 
asked: 
Q. Doctor, you have characterized the first part 
or you have said, let me put it this way, that you 
felt there was no premeditation prior to this act 
on the part of the Defendant to harm the child. 
Now what about more specifically once this event 
was under way. 
A. I think once the events were under way the 
actions were largely impulsive. He was simply 
frightened and angry because he was presented 
with a problem he couldn't handle. The child had 
been left in his custody. The child appeared in-
jured. H e didn't know how to deal with it and he 
was trying to, in fact, I think, make the child 
deny the reality of the injury. (T. 385). 
Mr. Hill asked the Doctor on re-direct: 
Q. Doctor, on cross examination the subject was 
also brought up about attempts to care for or aid 
the child during this altercation. Does that have 
any significance to you. Do you have an opinion 
as to what they might mean? 
A. I t would be my opinion that these attempts at 
first aid or rehabilitation of the child indicated 
that there was not the intent to harm the child or 
not the plan to harm the child. Otherwise why 
attempt to rehabilitate? (T. 387 Emphasis add-
ed.) 
There was no intent to harm the child. Where there 
is no intent to do great bodily injury the action cannot 
be defined as murder. Criminal intent is a basic factor 
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which must be proved before a court or jury can con-
vict of murder or any other crime. I t is expressed in the 
requirement that there can be no murder without malice 
aforethought. 
Malice aforethought has been defined by this 
Court in the case of State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 
P.2dl003 (1944). 
In order to have the necessary malice to commit 
murder (not necessarily in the first degree) the 
killing must be unlawful, it must result from or 
be caused by an act or omission to act committed 
with one of the following intentions: (1) an in-
tention or design previously formed to kill or 
cause great bodily injury or (2) an intention or 
design previously formed to do an act or omit to 
do an act knowing that the reasonable and na-
tural consequences thereof would be likely to 
cause death or great bodily injury; or (3) a pre-
viously thought out intentional or designed per-
petration or attempt to perpetrate one of certain 
kinds of felonies. (Emphasis added) 
In view of the definition of malice aforethought in 
the Russell case the State has the burden of proving 
that the defendant previously thought out beforehand 
and intended to do great bodily injury to the child. The 
State produced no evidence whatsoever to show such in-
tent and malice aforethought. The only evidence in the 
transcript concerning the issue is the testimony of Dr. 
Moench. The Doctor testified: 
I t is my opinion that this was an impulsive action 
and not an act of judgment or premeditation. 
(T. 367) 
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I think that once the events were under way the 
actions were largely impulsive. (T. 385) 
In the account of the experience and in the con-
fession both there didn't seem to be any delay. 
There seemed to be a situation and then an im-
mediate reaction rather than time to think or 
ponder or to ask for help or opinions from others 
until apparently the child was so badly injured 
and the Defendant's mother came home and in-
tervened. (T. 369) 
The definition of malice aforethought in the Rus-
sell case is supported in the case of State v. Trujillo, 
117 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153, p. 251: 
Malice aforethought is a state of mind. The 
aforethought is the giving thought beforehand to 
malicious feeling or desires. . . . Thus when mur-
der is defined as the unlawful killing oOiuman 
being after giving thought beforehand to the de-^ 
sire to kill or to cause great bodily injury or to 
do an act knowing that its reasonable and natural \ 
consequences would be death or great bodily in-
jury. (Emphasis added) 
The Court made a specific finding of fact that at 
the time of the inflicting of the injuries the Appellant 
intended to cause great bodily harm to the victim or 
should have known the reasonable consequences of his 
actions as dangerous to the victim. However there is 
absolutely no evidence in the record upon which to base 
such a Finding of Fact. There is substantial evidence to 
show that Kelsey had no intent to harm the child but 
none to show that he had such an intent or malice toward 
the child. The Court in addition specifically found that 
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"the psychiatric examination revealed that the Defend-
ant has a diminished capacity to control his impulses 
under circumstances similar to those which existed dur-
ing the time he was attacking the victim Raymond 
Eagle." The two findings of fact cannot be reconciled. 
Either Kelsey acted in an impulsive manner as shown 
by the extensive evidence in this case, or he had pre-
viously formed an intent to harm the child, and the 
record in this case is absolutely devoid of any evidence 
showing such intent. The Court concludes from these 
two Findings of Fact: 
In view of the psychiatric testimony regarding 
the defendant's inability to control himself in 
some degree, the Court finds that the killing was 
not premeditated and that the murder was there-
fore not murder in the first degree but murder 
in the second degree. 
The Court has grossly misconstrued the law in this con-
text. For if Kelsey is found to be unable to control 
himself in his impulses then he cannot have intended to 
harm the child and has not acted with malice afore-
thought. The Appellant's inability is not a mitigation 
of his actions which would reduce the crime from first 
degree to second degree murder but constitutes a com-
plete defense, since it shows that he acted without 
malice, and without malice there can be no murder, 
either first or second degree. The Court's Findings of 
Fact are absolutely unsupported by the evidence and 
the Court's Conclusions of Law as drawn from those 
facts, are contrary to law. Where the Appellant's had 
no criminal intent and no malice aforethought the Court 
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erred in finding him guilty of second degree murder 
and the judgment should be reversed. 
P O I N T V 
T H E F I N D I N G S O F F A C T A N D CON-
CLUSIONS OF L A W A R E C L E A R L Y ER-
RONEOUS A N D NOT S U B S T A N T I A T E D BY 
T H E E V I D E N C E 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
entered in accordance with Rule 52, U.R.C.P., and 
Section 77-44-2 U.C.A., 1953. Said Findings of Fact 
are not substantiated by the evidence and the Conclu-
sions of Law drawn therefrom are clearly erroneous. 
By Finding of Fact number three, the Court found 
that Kelsey either intended to cause bodily harm to the 
victim (which is entirely unsubstantiated by the evi-
dence) or he should have known the reasonable conse-
quences of his actions as dangerous to the victim. The 
only evidence in the record on this point is the testi-
mony of Dr. Weston and Dr. Moench, each of whom 
testified that the actions of the Defendant in this case 
were impulsive, and not premeditated and that he had 
no intent to harm the child. Further, said Finding of 
Fact is in conflict with Finding of Fact number five 
wherein the Court found that the Defendant had dim-
inished capacity to control his impulses. The Court in 
effect is finding both that the actions of the Defendant 
were impulsive and that they were intentional. The 
Court concludes from these facts in Conclusion of Law 
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number four that since the Defendant was unable to 
control himself he could not have premeditated the kill-
ing and thereby admits that since the actions were im-
pulsive they could not have been intentional. 
Conclusions of Law numbers two and three are not 
supported by any Finding of Fact. The Court con-
cludes that the beating was done intentionally and with 
malice aforethought willful, deliberate and malicious. 
Malice is defined by Section 76-30-2 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as follows: 
Malice defined—Such malice may be express or 
implied. I t is express when there is manifested a 
deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of 
a fellow creature. I t is implied where no consid-
erable provocation appears or where the circum-
stances attending the killing show an abandoned 
and malignant heart. 
Said section clearly demonstrates that in order to 
have malice aforethought, the defendant must have an 
intention to kill. The Court found as a matter of fact 
that the Defendant intended to cause bodily harm or 
should have known that his actions were dangerous, not 
that he intended to kill, and Kelsey had no such intent 
to kill. Further, the Court did not find as a matter of 
fact that the malice aforethought was implied. In order 
to make such a conclusion the Court would have to find 
that the Defendant had an abandoned and malignant 
heart. There is no such Finding of Fact. In addition 
there is no Finding of Fact touching upon the provoca-
tion, whether considerable or slight. The evidence shows 
that Kelsey was provoked time after time and that he 
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impulsively struck out against the child in response to 
such provocation. Conclusion of Law numbers two and 
three are clearly erroneous as they are not supported 
by the evidence nor by any Finding of Fact made by 
the Court. 
Conclusion number four entered by the Court is 
clearly erroneous. Evidently, since the Court found that 
the Defendant is unable to control his impulses it con-
cluded that the killing was not premeditated and the 
murder was not first degree but murder in the second 
degree. Nothing in the statutes nor the case law war-
rants such a conclusion. If Kelsey's inability to control 
himself was such as to make the Court doubt his sanity 
then such inability does not merely reduce the crime 
from first to second degree murder but is a complete 
defense and the Appellant should be acquitted. State 
V. Green, 86 Utah 192, 40 P.2d 961 (1935). On the 
other hand if Kelsey's inability to control his impulses 
was an "emotional disturbance which rendered his mind 
incapable of cool reflection" then he had no malice 
aforethought and the crime was not murder in any de-
gree. State v. Leggroan, 25 Utah 2d 32, 475 P . 2d 
57 (1970); see especially Judge Crockett's dissent in 
said case. 
Since the Findings of Fact were clearly erroneous 
and not supported by subtantial evidence and the Con-
clusions of Law clearly show an erroneous view of the 
law, the judgment should be reversed and a new trial 
granted. William v. U.S., 267 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 
1959). 
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P O I N T VI 
T H E T R I A L W A S I N C O M P L E T E S INCE 
T H E F I N D I N G S O F F A C T A N D CONCLU-
SIONS O F L A W W E R E NOT E N T E R E D BY 
T H E J U D G E W H O H E A R D T H E E V I -
D E N C E 
Section 77-44-2 U.C.A., 1953, provides that the 
rules of evidence in civil action shall be applicable to 
criminal actions. In accordance with that statute and 
Rule 52 U.R.C.P. which provides that the defendant is 
entitled to Findings if the case is heard without a jury, 
the Court ruled that Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law should be entered in these proceedings (R. 530). 
The Honorable D. Frank Wilkins retired from the 
bench prior to the time that said Findings and Con-
clusions were executed or entered in the proceedingss 
and they were not entered until May 14, 1974 and 
executed by Judge Baldwin. Rule 63 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides that if a Judge, before 
whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the 
duties to be performed by the Court after a verdict is 
returned or Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
are filed then any other Judge regularly sitting in or 
assigned to the Court in which the action was tried may 
perform those duties; but if such other Judge is satis-
fied that he cannot perform duties because he did not 
preside at the trial or for any other reason he may in 
his discretion grant a new trial. 
No verdict was returned in this case since there 
was no jury to return a verdict. "Verdict" means only 
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the formal decision made by a jury and not a decision 
made by the Court. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed. 
1951, p. 1730, Schofield v. Baker, 242 F.657, (D.C. 
Wash. 1917). 
A new Judge who has not heard the evidence can-
not perform the duty of executing and entering the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law under Rule 
63. When the Judge who heard the evidence goes out 
of office without filing Findings of Fact the trial is 
incomplete and no proper judgment can be entered. 
Mace v. O'Reilley. 70 Cal. 231, 11 P . 721 (1886). A 
new Judge cannot make Findings of Fact fairly with-
out hearing the evidence. Chiricahua Ranches Com-
pany v. State, 44 Ariz. 559, 39 P.2d 640 (1934). Only 
a new trial can be ordered by the judge. Ten O Win 
Amusement Company v. Casino Theatre, 2 F.R.D. 242 
(D.C. Cal. 1942). In the case of Makah Indian Tribe 
v. Moore, 93 F.Supp. 105, (D.C. Wash. 1950) the 
Judge who heard the evidence had given a lengthy oral 
opinion which was recorded and entered in the record. 
When that Judge died prior to the time that the Find-
ings were entered a new Judge found that the Find-
ings were contained in his oral opinion and that a 
judgment could be entered thereon. However, the 
Court in that case determined that the new Judge could 
not sign Findings of Fact as such. I t was not proper 
for him to do so since only the Judge who heard the 
evidence can make Findings of Fact. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate what 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law might have 
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been made by Judge Wilkins, who heard the evidence. 
Since no Findings of Fact were entered the trial is in-
complete and a new trial must be granted under Rule 
63. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons counsel respectfully submits 
that the case should either be dismissed or reversed and 
remanded for a new trial consistent with holdings of 
this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E L A I N E D. L A R S E N 
455 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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